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Abstract 
 
This paper considers two important questions about FDI determinants: 1) 
what were the most important determinants that attracted FDI to developing 
countries in the top 20 FDI host countries between the years over the past 
three decades and 2) to evaluate whether FDI is more attracted to 
investment incentives or to the country’s economic environment. Using a 
panel data with fixed effects model, we conclude that a country’s economic 
environment is more important for FDI and that tax and tariff incentives are 
not significant factors for foreign investors when we control for 
macroeconomic variables. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The past three decades have witnessed a significant increase in Foreign 
Direction Investment (FDI) to developing countries, vis-à-vis developed countries, 
which had the lead in the 1990s. According to UNCTAD, developing and 
transition economies currently account for 50% of world FDI inflows, balancing 
the share of developed economies as shown in Figure 1 below. Most of world 
FDI is initiated from developed countries, who seek high profit rates in developing 
host markets, low-cost labor abundance or new markets for their products. 
Developing countries, on the other hand, have low domestic saving rates and are 
set to benefit from increased employment, technological know-how and 
productivity spillovers from developed countries, since FDI is long-term in nature 
and utilizes a large share of its inputs from domestic factors of production.  
Figure 1: FDI Inflows by Group of Economies, % of World Total, 1990-2017 
Source: UNCTAD, FDI database  
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Given the importance of FDI to developing countries, a very important 
question arises: Why does FDI go where it goes? There are two popular 
perspectives in this regard, where the first states that FDI is attracted to factor 
endowments and flows to countries with natural resources, cheap labor and large 
markets. The second suggests that countries that adopt more favorable 
investment policies and offer attractive investment incentives are more likely to 
draw FDI inflows. 
Due to the mixed evidence from the literature regarding the location 
decision of foreign investors, we decided to take a new approach and focus on 
the top FDI-attracting developing countries over the past 27 years. We ranked 
developing countries with the highest average FDI between 1990 and 2017 and 
through a panel data model, we answer whether these countries focused on 
investment policies or rather on making their macroeconomic environment more 
attractive to foreign investors. These 20 countries alone account for 88% of total 
FDI inflows to developing countries over the past 27 years. 
The motivation of this study is to answer two important questions: 1) What 
are the most important factors that affect investors’ decision to invest FDI in a 
certain host country and 2) Do government investment policies (tax, customs, 
investment laws, lowering corruption, political stability …etc.) matter to foreign 
investors or are they attracted to larger host markets mainly and incentives serve 
as the cherry on the cake?  
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By determining the most common factors that attracted FDI in these host 
countries, other developing countries can follow the steps of their peers to 
increase their respective shares of FDI as well. 
We test the common hypothesis in the literature that FDI is attracted by 
government investment policies, including investment incentives, in developing 
countries and compare the effect of government policy determinants vis-à-vis the 
economic environment determinants. 
The remainder of the paper will be organized as follows. Chapter II 
reviews the literature on the determinants of FDI, with a special focus on 
research on developing countries. Chapter III describes the data and the 
definitions of the explanatory variables. Chapter IV presents and discusses the 
empirical results of the model. Finally, Chapter V concludes. 
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II. Literature Review 
 
There is an abundant body of studies examining the determinants of FDI. 
Most of these empirical studies use country level cross sectional or panel data 
models to test the effect of certain variables that may potentially have an effect 
on FDI according to economic theory. Additionally, other studies use firm-level 
data or survey data to get more micro-level results for a cetrian host country. 
These variables include investment policies and incentives such as tax 
rates, tariff rates, quality of infrastructure; and macroeconomic variables such as 
GDP, trade openness and natural resources abundance. 
Thus the first step in understanding how countries attract FDI is to review 
the available literature on the different variables and their effect on FDI. Most of 
the research papers focus on the developed countries which have the highest 
FDI inflows. Developed countries differ a lot from developing countries in FDI 
determinants. Therefore, we will focus mainly on developing countries in our 
review of the literature, which is our main interest in this research study. Below is 
a summary of the main findings in the seminal literature. 
This section will be divided into two parts, the first will focus on the 
literature on government investment policy indicators and the second part will 
review the economic environment indicators. 
II.A Government Investment Policies 
 
A large number of governments implement investment incentives to try to 
attract FDI to its economy and promote its investment policies, competing with 
other countries with investment reforms. Incentives include lower tax rates, tax 
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holidays, lower tariff rates, new investment laws that favour foreign investors, 
free zone areas, developing reliable infrastructure for investment, lower lending 
interest rates, lowering corruption incidence, among others. These incentives 
have become a first defence line by governments to appeal to foreign investors.  
However, these incentives come at a cost, and in many countries have a 
marginal effect on increasing FDI flows to the host country for other 
macroeconomic reasons for example. Most of the empirical literature in the 
coming section supports the notion that incentives do not have a major impact, 
particularly if these host countries have other major problems on the political or 
economic sides and incentives cannot compensate for them alone. 
II.A.1 Tax Rate 
 
The effect of taxes on investment decision is a much-studied phenomenon 
in economics. However, the literature on taxes and FDI is in debate about the 
direction and magnitude of this relationship. Most of these papers point out that 
the effect of taxes on FDI can vary substantially by type of taxes, measurement 
of FDI activity, and tax treatment in the host and parent countries. Another 
important issue is that most multinational companies face a double taxation issue 
between the host and the home countries. Most countries have different ways of 
addressing this double taxation issue, which further complicates the study of the 
effects of taxes on FDI. 
Rationally, it is believed that higher taxes discourage investment 
decisions. Most of these studies are based on a cross section of host countries 
with varying tax rates. Hartman (1984, 1985) was the first to point out a way in 
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which certain types of FDI may surprisingly not be very sensitive to taxes. 
Hartman tested mainly the relation between FDI as a ratio of GNP and domestic 
tax policy in the United States of America (USA) between 1965 and 1979. 
Hartman differentiated between two types of FDI, one that is financed from 
retained earnings to expand current operations and one that is financed by 
transferring of funds from abroad. He found that the former responded more to 
the host country tax rate, whereas transfer FDI did not respond meaningfully to 
host country tax rate. The key insight by Hartman is that earnings by an affiliate 
in foreign country will ultimately be subject to parent and host country taxes 
regardless of whether it is repatriated or reinvested in the foreign affiliate to 
generate further earnings. 
Similarly, Grubert and Mutti (1991), Hines and Rice (1994), Loree and 
Guisinger (1995), Kemsley (1998) and Billington (1999) all find a significant 
negative relation. More recently, Hasset and Hubbard (2002) found a negative 
relation with an elasticity between -0.5 - -1.0 using microeconomic data. De Mooji 
and Ederveen (2003) studied the impact of company taxes on the company’s FDI 
decision by calculating the elasticity of FDIs to tax rates through a meta-analysis 
of 25 empirical studies. They found that the elasticity stands at -3.3. Desai, Foley 
and Hines (2004b) focused on indirect taxes other than income taxes and their 
effect on FDI by US multinational corporations and found that it has a very 
significant effect on after tax return of these firms and thus their investment 
decisions.  
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Goodspeed, Martinez-Vazquez and Zhang (2006) found that lower taxes 
attract FDIs with an elasticity of -0.67 for 53 developing and developed countries 
between 1984 and 2002. Klemm and Van Parys (2009) test the efficacy of tax 
incentives by looking not only at tax rates, but also at tax holidays in 40 Latin 
American and African countries between 1985 and 2004. They found that tax 
incentives affect FDI in lower-income countries. Grubert (2012) used a different 
approach, by looking at the tax differential between foreign and domestic tax 
rates and FDI decision; he found that a change in a company’s effective foreign 
tax rate has a large and statistically significant impact on its FDI decision with 
elasticity of -0.436. Barrios et al. (2012) used panel data from 33 European 
countries between the years 1999 to 2003 to examine the separate effects of 
host and additional parent country taxation on the location decisions of 
multinational firms. They found that both types of taxation have a negative impact 
on the location of new foreign subsidiaries with an elasticity of -0.87. 
On the other hand, Wheeler and Mody (1992) found an insignificant effect 
of taxes on FDI for countries with good infrastructure and expanding domestic 
market. 
II.A.2 Tariff Rate 
 
Over the past three decades at least, developing countries have made 
massive progression in opening up their domestic markets to international trade 
and lowering their tariff rates. A number of countries have also worked on their 
non-tariff barriers, in an attempt to attract FDI that is focused on exporting to 
nearby countries. In a study on impact of tariff structure on FDI in Pakistan 
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between 1973 and 2011, Pervez and Malik (2013) conclude that lower tariffs 
attract FDI and that countries should use them as an incentive to promote FDI.  
Similarly, Du, Harrison and Jefferson (2014) found that tariff reductions in 
China increased FDI and enhanced productivity spillovers between 1998 and 
2007 using a firm-level dataset of manufacturing companies in China. Banga 
(2003) also found that lower tariffs attract FDI in a panel study on 15 developing 
countries in Asia for the period 1980 to 2000.  
On the other hand, there is an opposite argument in favour of high 
protection, arguing that higher tariffs encourage foreign investment in the high 
tariff-levying country by increasing the cost to export. Thus FDI in this case may 
seek to operate locally in countries with higher tariff rates to mitigate the effect of 
exporting their products to these high protection countries. This “tariff-jumping 
FDI” has become an important incentive of inward FDI to many high-protection 
host countries with large market sizes, where FDI is attracted to higher tariff rate 
countries, and not the opposite. Belderbos (1997) investigated the effect of high 
tariff rates on FDI and found that higher protection measures have led to 
substantially higher investments in the manufacturing sectors in these countries. 
Similarly, Blonigen et al. (2002) found a similar positive response from FDI to 
high tariffs in the USA in the period of 1980-1990. 
II.A.3 Quality of Infrastructure 
 
Good infrastructure is essential for investment, and many countries invest 
heavily in its infrastructure development to attract new investment, especially 
FDI. Investors prefer a well-developed infrastructure that includes roads, ports 
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airports as well as technology and electricity to be able to operate their 
investments. In their study on manufacturing investment decisions by US 
multination firms in a panel of 42 countries for the period 1982-1988, Wheeler 
and Mody (1992) found that quality of infrastructure is a significant determinant of 
FDI using Business International’s (BI) country score for infrastructure quality, 
which measures the quality of transport, communications and energy 
infrastructure. Kumar (1994) and Loree and Guisinger (1995) also found a 
positive effect of infrastructure on FDI. 
Asiedu (2002) and Demirhan and Masca (2008) used the number of 
telephone lines as their variable for infrastructure and found it to be positively 
related and significant in their models on Sub-Saharan African countries and 
developing counties, respectively. Addison and Heshmati (2003) found that 
information and communication technology (ICT) increase FDI inflows to 
developing countries. Nunes and Peschiera (2006) used public expenditure on 
capital to acquire fixed capital assets, land, non-tangible assets, and non-
financial non-military assets as an indicator for infrastructure quality and it had a 
positive impact on FDI on their model. 
Campos and Kinoshita (2008) also used the number of telephone lines per 
1,000 people as a proxy for infrastructure development in their study on 25 
transition economies, but the variable was not significant. Onyeiwu and Shrestha 
(2004) and Morriset (2000) used the same indicator as well in their panel dataset 
models and it was also not significant, which the latter asserted to the fact that it 
does not reflect the quality and costs of the telecommunication.  
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Finally, Khadaroo and Seetanah (2009) analyzed the role of transport 
infrastructure availability in attracting FDI, by using the length of paved roads per 
square kilometer of area, in 33 African economies between 1984 and 2002 and 
found it to be an important factor for FDI. 
II.A.4 Corruption 
 
Corruption can be a routine hurdle for investors especially in developing 
countries. Despite a considerable number of theoretical and empirical studies, 
there is still no agreement on the direction of the impact of corruption on firms’ 
investment decisions. Empirical analyses have not yet consistently confirmed the 
negative relationship between corruption and FDI. 
There are two lines of thought in the literature regarding the effect of 
corruption on FDI, the “grabbing hand” corruption theory and the “helping hand” 
corruption theory. The former states that there is a negative impact of corruption 
on FDI due to the high costs of corruption, whereas the latter suggests a positive 
effect as it facilitates bureaucratic and administrative approvals and speed up 
investment timeline.   
Kaufmann (1997) found that the costs of investing in a more corrupt host 
country were shown to be as much as 20% higher than those of a less corrupt 
one. Wei (2000) studied the effect of corruption on FDI flows in the early 1990s 
from 14 developed countries to 45 host countries and found a significant and 
negative effect on FDI. He used 3 different indicators for corruption, the Business 
International (BI) corruption measure, the International Country Risk Group 
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(ICRG) Corruption indicator and the Corruption Perception Index published by 
Transparency International (TI). 
Drabek and Payne (2001), tested if transparency had an effect on FDI by 
creating a composite transparency index compiled from the ICRG rankings in five 
areas: corruption, law and order, bureaucratic quality, contract viability and the 
risk of government expropriation of private assets. Their results indicated that 
FDI is negatively impacted by high levels of non-transparency. 
Egger and Winner (2006) also find a negative relation between FDI and 
corruption, but it is relevant only for FDI to non-OECD countries, and that the 
effect of corruption has declined over the past decade, and that other 
macroeconomic factors have become more important determinants of FDI. Habib 
and Zurawicki (2002), Javorcik and Wei (2009), Busse and Hefeker (2007) and 
Hakkala et al. (2008) all found similar results for both developed and developing 
countries. 
On the other hand, Wheeler and Mody (1992), Bjorvatn and Soreide 
(2005) and Saha (2000) find that corruption in the host country will not 
necessarily discourage FDI from foreign firms. 
More recently, Barassi and Zhou (2014) analysed the effect of corruption 
on multinational enterprises’ decision to invest in 52 developing and developed 
host countries using a parametric and a non-parametric model between 1996 
and 2003 based on Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index.  
They found that corruption has a significant negative effect on FDI decisions by 
firms in both models. Interestingly, their parametric study also found that a higher 
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level of corruption would deter FDI from taking place, however once a country is 
selected as the host country for other determinants, a higher level of corruption 
would not deter FDI. 
We can conclude from the review of the literature on government 
investment policies is that most research reviewed found a significant negative 
relation between FDI and tax rates, even when different types of tax incentives 
were used.  However, the results on the tariff rates were inconclusive, where 
some papers found evidence of negative effect of high protection whereas other 
papers found evidence of the “tariff-jumping” FDI theory. 
The quality of infrastructure, usually using the number of telephone lines 
per 1,00 people, due to lack of data on infrastructure bases of countries, found a 
positive relation to FDI inflows, with the exception of a few papers which found no 
significant effect. The authors   stated that the insignificant effect could   be due 
to the fact that number of telephone lines does not give any evidence on the 
quality of infrastructure. 
Finally, the reviewed mostly papers found a negative relation between FDI 
and corruption, which confirms that high corruption increases the cost of 
investment and rips investors of equal opportunities. However, a number of 
models found that the helping-hand theory of corruption is applicable in some 
developing countries, as discussed in the review above. The reviewed literature 
on government investment policies is summarized in table 1 below. 
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Table 1: Summary of Government Investment Policies on FDI in the Literature 
 Effect on FDI in Different Papers 
Variable Positive Negative Insignificant 
Tax Rate 
  Grubert and Mutti (1991) Wheeler and Mody (1992) 
Hines and Rice (1994) 
Loree and Guisinger (1995)  
Kemsley (1998)  
Billington (1999)  
Hasset and Hubbard (2002)  
De Mooji and Ederveen (2003) 
Foley and Hines (2004b)  
Goodspeed et al. (2006) 
Klemm and Van Parys (2009)  
Barrios et al. (2012)  
Tariff Rate 
Belderbos (1997)  Pervez and Malik (2013)  
  Blonigen et al. (2002)  Du, Harrison and Jefferson (2014)  
  Banga (2003)  
Quality of Infrastructure 
Wheeler and Mody (1992)    Campos and Kinoshita (2008) 
Kumar (1994)  Onyeiwu and Shrestha (2004) 
Loree and Guisinger (1995)  Morriset (2000) 
Asiedu (2002)  
 
Demirhan and Masca (2008)  
 
Addison and Heshmati (2003) 
 
Nunes and Peschiera (2006)  
 
Khadaroo and Seetanah (2009)   
 
Corruption 
  Kaufmann (1997)  Wheeler and Mody (1992) 
Wei (2000)  Bjorvatn and Soreide (2005)  
Drabek and Payne (2001) Saha (2000) 
Egger and Winner (2006)    
Habib and Zurawicki (2002)   
Javorcik and Wei (2009)   
Busse and Hefeker (2007) Hakkala et al. (2008)   
 Barassi and Zhou (2014)   
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B. Economic Environment 
Within the economic environment of host markets, the accepted 
hypothesis is that FDI is mainly attracted to large markets with high growth and 
natural resources as well as abundant labor. However, market size appears to be 
the most important robust and positive determinant of FDI within this category, as 
we will see in the following review. 
II.B.1 Host Market Size and Growth 
 
Market size and market growth are considered as the most important 
determinants of FDI. Almost every study on FDI in developing countries has 
found a positive relationship between economic growth and FDI. Larger markets 
and population size in host countries present a higher demand potential and thus 
attracts FDI for companies seeking horizontally or open new export markets. The 
most significant and extensively referenced study that links market size to FDI 
was by Dunning (1993), who was the first to classify FDI intro three types; 
market-seeking, which aims to open new markets for its products, 2) resource-
seeking, which aims to make-use of natural resources not easily or cheaply 
accessible in home market and 3) efficiency-seeking, which aims to lower cost of 
production by relocating to lower-cost markets to achieve economies of scale. 
Wheeler and Moody (1992) and Billington (1999) also found a positive 
relation between the two.  More recently, Chakrabarti (2001) used GDP per 
capita as a proxy for a host country’s market size and found that it is the most 
important factor in attracting FDI by using an Extreme Bound Analysis (EBA) on 
135 countries in 1994. Addison and Heshmati (2003) found GDP growth to be 
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positive and significant in their model on the importance of ICT and 
democratization in developing countries between 1970 and 1990. Similarly, in a 
panel data model on determinants of FDI in 29 developing countries between 
1975 and 1999, Onyeiwu and Shrestha (2004) used the same variable and found 
it to have a significant effect in both of their modes, the fixed effect and the 
random effect models. 
Artige and Nicolini (2005) state that market size as measured by GDP or 
GDP per capita is the most robust FDI determinant. Demirhan and Masca (2008) 
utilized the growth of per capita real GDP to control for market size and not GDP 
in absolute terms that may only reflect population growth and found it has an 
effect on FDI attraction. 
II.B.2 Labor Supply and Cost 
 
The availability of low-cost skilled labor is a very important for factor for 
investment in developing countries. However, potential foreign investors should 
also consider labor quality, as developing countries may have an abundance of 
cheap unskilled labor, but this requires a lot of additional costs to train and 
educate. Banga (2003) finds that the cost of labor estimated using real wages as 
well as high skilled-labor, estimated by higher secondary enrollment rate and 
labor productivity, are important factors in attracting FDI to developing countries 
in his model of 15 developing countries between the years 1980 and 2000.  
On the other hand, in their study on ASEAN countries over the period 
1991 – 2009, Hoang and Bui (2015) found that low-cost labor does not attract 
FDI to the region, whereas labor productivity was significant, which is as 
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important to investors. Wahid et al. (2009) used nominal wage rate as a proxy for 
labor cost in their model on FDI determinants in 20 African countries found it to 
be a significant negative factor affecting FDI. Demirhan and Masca (2008) 
studied labor cost per worker in manufacturing industry and found it to be 
insignificant in affecting FDI decisions in their cross-section analysis on 
developing countries in the period studied. 
II.B.3 Exchange Rate  
 
One of the important macroeconomic variables in a country is the 
movement of its exchange rate. Exchange rate depreciation has a negative effect 
on the value of foreign assets invested in a country and on the profits to be 
repatriated to the mother company in home country. The link between exchange 
rate stability has been investigated in a number of studies in the literature, 
whereas some studies focused on the level of exchange rate versus the USD on 
FDI inflows.  
The direction of the relationship depends on the whether the cost or the 
income effect is stronger. The cost effect is when depreciation has a negative 
effect on current account when the country is a net importer, whereas the income 
effect is the increase in competitiveness that follows exchange rate depreciation 
for export-oriented countries. The net effect depends on which effect is greater. 
Thus we find mixed results in the literature regarding exchange rates. 
Blonigen (1997) used real exchange rate in his model on Japanese 
acquisitions in the USA to test the effect of exchange rate on foreign direct 
investment, and found that a weaker dollar attracted Japanese FDI.  Kiyota and 
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Urata (2004) also found that the depreciation of the currency attracted FDI, 
whereas the volatility of exchange rates discouraged FDI inflows. 
II.B.4 Inflation 
 
Inflation rate is considered an indicator for macroeconomic stability of a 
country by investors. A low and stable inflation shows the commitment of the 
government, through its Central bank policies, to achieve a stable environment in 
which investors and consumers can make informed decisions and predict their 
future costs and profits with confidence. Furthermore, low inflation preserves the 
purchasing power of currencies and leads to lower interest rates in the economy. 
Thus countries with low stable inflation have been associated with high FDI 
inflows. 
Onyeiwu and Shrestha (2004) found that inflation is a negative significant 
in both fixed and random effects models. Demirhan and Masca (2008) and 
Asiedu (2013) also found a negative significant effect of inflation of FDI. Addison 
and Heshmati (2003) used inflation rate and variance of inflation rate in their FDI 
model and both were either insignificant or weakly significant in their two models.  
Busse and Hefeker (2007) used the GDP deflator as a proxy for 
macroeconomic stability and found no significant relationship between inflation 
and FDI. Asiedu (2002) and Campos and Kinoshita (2003) also found no 
significant relationship between inflation and FDI in their model.  
II.B.5 Trade Openness 
 
A country’s openness to trade, measured in the literature commonly as the 
sum of imports and exports as a % of GDP, is a positive determinant of FDI in 
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most of the studies on FDI in developing countries. This is due to the perception 
that open economies encourage investors who target to export their production to 
nearby countries or to easily and cheaply import their required inputs from 
abroad. Another indicator of openness is the relative size of the export sector 
relative to the country’s GDP as well as trade as a share of GDP.  
Charkrabarti (2001) finds that openness to trade, measured by sum of 
imports and exports to GDP, is one of the most important factors in attracting 
FDI. Nunes and Peschiera (2006) also used the same indicator and it had a 
positive significant impact on attracting FDI. Addison and Heshmati (2003) also 
find that openness to trade has a positive impact on FDI flows. Asiedu (2002) 
also found openness to be an important factor for FDI attraction in her model on 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Onyeiwu and Shrestha (2004) followed the 
same methodology and found that openness is a very important determinant of 
FDI flows to Africa. 
II.B.6 Availability of Natural Resources 
 
For Africa and the Gulf region specially, it is known that FDI is mainly 
driven by natural resources abundance, called resource- or asset-seeking FDI. 
This type of FDI seeks to invest abroad to acquire resources not available in the 
home country, such as natural resources, mainly oil and coal, and raw materials 
that would otherwise be expensive to import to home country. 
In their panel model on 25 transition economies between 1990 and 1998, 
Campos and Kinoshita (2003) found that natural resources abundance has a 
significant and positive effect on FDI. Similarly, Onyeiwu and Shrestha (2004) 
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found that natural resource availability is a significant factor in FDI attraction in 
their study on FDI flows to Africa based on a panel dataset of 29 African 
countries over the period 1975 and 1999. 
In contrast, Asiedu (2013) tested the significance of natural resources on 
attraction of FDI in 99 developing countries. She employed two different 
measures of natural resources, share of fuel of total merchandise exports and oil 
rent as a percent of GDP. She found that natural resources have a negative 
effect on FDI. This is consistent with the “FDI-natural resources curse”, where 
countries with abundant natural resources tend to grow slower than countries 
with scarce natural resources (Sachs & Warner, 2001). 
Similarly, Poelhekke and Ploeg (2010) found that natural resources boost 
FDI in the resource sector but crowds out FDI in the non-resource sector, and 
that the total FDI is less in resource rich countries due to the dominating effect on 
the non-resource sector. 
From the reviewed research on economic environment determinants, we 
find that the most robust factor is the host market size and growth, which has a 
significant positive relation in all papers reviewed. Following suit was the trade 
openness of host countries, measured customarily as sum of imports and exports 
as a % of GDP in most models, was the second most important factor for FDI.   
Despite its importance for foreign investors in developing economies, 
eexchange rate stability was not very commonly used in the literature, were only 
a few papers included the exchange rate effect and found it to be negatively 
related to FDI inflows. 
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On the other hand, labor cost and inflation had mixed results, which were 
either negative or insignificant in the research reviewed. Natural resources rent 
was controversial, as some papers found a strong support for resource-seeking 
FDI theories, whereas others found evidence of the “natural resources curse” 
that is evident in some resource-rich developing countries. The results of the 
reviewed papers are summarized in table 2 below. 
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Table 2: Summary of Economic Environment on FDI in the Literature 
 
 
Effect on FDI in Different Papers 
Variable Positive Negative Insignificant 
Host Market size and growth 
Wheeler and Moody (1992) 
Billington (1999)  
    
Chakrabarti (2001)  
Addison and Heshmati (2003)  
Onyeiwu and Shrestha (2004)  
Artige and Nicolini (2005)  
Demirhan and Masca (2008)  
Labor Cost 
  Banga (2003)  Hoang and Bui (2015) 
Wahid et al. (2009)  Demirhan and Masca (2008)  
Exchange Rate 
  Blonigen (1997)    
Kiyota and Urata (2004) 
Inflation 
  Onyeiwu and Shrestha (2004)  Addison and Heshmati (2003)  
Demirhan and Masca (2008) Busse and Hefeker (2007)  
Asiedu (2013) Asiedu (2002) 
  Campos and Kinoshita (2003)  
Trade Openness 
Charkrabarti (2001)      
Nunes and Peschiera (2006)  
Addison and Heshmati (2003) 
Asiedu (2002)  
Onyeiwu and Shrestha (2004) 
Availability of Natural 
Resources 
Campos and Kinoshita (2003)  Asiedu (2013)    
Onyeiwu and Shrestha (2004)  Poelhekke and Ploeg (2010)  
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II.C. Contribution of Study 
After reviewing the extensive literature of FDI determinants, we find mixed 
results of studies on different regions and over different time horizons. This study 
contributes to the literature by concentrating on top 20 FDI-attracting developing 
countries to provide a more comprehensive list of common determinants among 
these countries that led to achieving the highest FDI inflows over the period 1990 
to 2017 to test our research question of whether FDI is attracted to government 
investment policies or to macroeconomic environment of host countries. 
We also test new variables in our model not commonly tested in the 
literature before; including access to credit, share of private consumption as well 
as the size of the services sector. We also use the labor force participation rate 
instead of the labor cost to test the significance of labor abundance, as will be 
shown in Chapter III hereafter. Finally, our research also aims to give policy 
implication insights to other developing countries to follow their peers to increase 
their share of FDI as well.  
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III. Data and Model Methodology 
 
III.A Research Design 
 
This study will be designed as a panel data model of the top 20 FDI-
attracting developing countries between the years 1990 and 2017. The top 20 
host developing countries were chosen on the basis of highest average FDI 
inflows in USD between the years 1990 and 2017, according to the World Bank 
FDI inflow data. We focus on the first 20 countries to allow diversification in 
regions but maintain some homogeneity between the countries included in the 
model to arrive at objective consistent results that can be applied to all other 
developing countries. Country FDI rankings are shown in table 1 in appendix. 
To determine the factors that contributed to the highest inflows, the FDI as 
a % of GDP of these countries will be tested against a number of indicators to 
determine the most significant indicators through a panel data model over the 
research’s time horizon.  
III.B Variables Definition 
 
The variables included in the model include government investment policy 
factors and economic environment factors. It is worth noting that the choice of 
some variables was constrained by data availability, as some variables are not 
available or have a lot of missing values for developing countries. For example, 
data on wages is not readily available for most developing countries, so it was 
excluded from our model, even though it is one of the important variables in the 
economic environment group. Also, the tax rate used in our model is the 
corporate tax rate, whereas it is better to utilize a broader measure like total tax 
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contribution for example, which was not available for most developing countries 
as well.  
As is standard in the literature, the dependent variable in our model is net 
FDI inflows, which is measured as new investment inflows less disinvestment by 
foreign investors, as a share of GDP. Explanatory variables within the 
government investment policy group include tax rate, tariff rate, infrastructure 
development, corruption Index, government stability and interest rate. The 
economic environment group variables include real market growth, trade 
openness, access to credit, inflation, availability of natural resources, exchange 
rate stability, size of services sector, labor force and final consumption. 
Furthermore, the first lag of the dependent variable was used as an explanatory 
variable to account for the incremental nature of FDI and to correct for serial 
autocorrelation in the model. The summary of variable definitions are shown in 
table 2 in appendix and explained below. 
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III.B.1. Government Investment Policy Variables Description 
a. Tax Rate 
The statutory corporate tax rate, sourced from KPMG corporate tax rates 
database, was utilized to account for tax rates paid by corporates in host country. 
Higher tax rates are expected to reduce investors’ profits and deter investments if 
too high, thus the effect is expected to be negative on FDI inflows. 
b. Tariff Rate 
The average of effective tariff rates on all traded products is used to 
account for trade protection. Normally, higher tariffs discourage export-seeking 
FDI, but in some case, as discussed in the literature review, sometimes FDI is 
tariff-jumping and goes to high tariff countries to have cheap access to these 
markets instead of exporting at the high tariff rates. Thus the sign of the relation 
can either be positive or negative depending on the type of FDI and the host 
country. 
c. Infrastructure Development 
To account for infrastructure development, the number of subscriptions to 
a mobile telephone service that provide access using cellular technology per 100 
people was used as a proxy. The better the infrastructure of a country, the higher 
potential it has to attract FDI which prefers developed markets in terms of 
transportation and technology availability. Thus, the relationship is expected to 
be positive. 
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d. Access to Credit 
Ease of access to banking credit is a major impediment in a number of 
developing markets, that are underbanked and access to credit by foreign 
investors is even more difficult and requires a large number of procedures and 
approvals, which makes a lot of foreign investors rely on credit from mother 
company or home country. Given the absence of data on credit to foreign 
investors, we use domestic credit to the private sector as a % of GDP as a proxy 
for access to credit in our model, and it is expected to have a positive impact on 
FDI. 
e. Corruption  
 
Corruption distorts market efficiency and accountability and leads to 
unequal opportunities for investors. However, it is a common phenomenon in 
developing countries in varying degrees, and is to be expected by foreign 
investors. We utilize here the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), computed 
by the PRS Group, a measure of corruption within the political system, which is 
an index that varies from zero to six, with higher values indicating lower 
corruption.  
III.B.2. Economic Environment Variables Description 
 
a. Host Market Growth 
 
High-growth economies are attractive to FDI that seeks to operate in large 
markets with high demand and fast-growing investments. Furthermore, 
economies that are growing quickly are known to implement sound economic 
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policies, which further enhance FDI attraction. We utilize annual GDP growth at 
market prices based on constant local currency. GDP growth is the single most 
robust significant variable in explaining variation in FDI, thus it is expected to 
have a positive sign. 
b. Trade Openness 
Almost all previous studies have found a positive relationship between 
openness of an economy and FDI. We follow the literature and use exports of 
goods and services as a share of GDP to account for the openness of the 
economy. 
c. Inflation 
Most developing economies experience high inflation rates, which is 
consistent with the high growth rates of these economies. However, high inflation 
rates hurdle decision making and makes planning very difficult for investors who 
cannot accurately forecast prices in the near future. Furthermore, it decreases 
the value of currency and thus the value of investments in these economies. 
Thus we expect that countries with high inflation rates to be less attractive to FDI. 
We use the first lag of annual inflation, measured as the change in the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI), in our model as we found evidence from diagnostic tests that 
inflation has a lagged effect. 
d. Availability of Natural Resources 
 
Resource-rich nations are usually a target for FDI, especially resource-
seeking FDI as we discussed before, which take advantage of the abundant 
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resources of oil and natural gas mainly and usually flow to these sectors. We 
account for availability of natural through the total natural resources rent as a % 
of GDP, which includes oil, natural gas, coal and mineral rents. In our model, we 
expect availability of natural resources to be a positive factor in attracting FDI to 
developing countries. 
e. Exchange Rate Stability 
 
A constant change in exchange rates signals to investors policy instability 
and may lead to huge losses when repatriating their profits to mother company or 
home country in USD. Thus exchange rate stability is a very important factor for 
foreign investors. We account for stability as the annual change in the average 
exchange rate of the local currency versus the USD, and expect a negative 
relation between this change and FDI inflows. 
f. Size of Services Sector 
 
The share of services sector has been gaining momentum over other 
sectors in the economy, especially in developing countries. A lot of FDI has been 
diverted from the traditional manufacturing sector to the services sector, thus we 
incorporate the share of the services sector as a % of GDP in our model to 
capture this effect and expect a positive relation. 
g. Labor Force 
 
The availability and quality of labor force is very important for FDI, as most 
investments will have to rely on domestic labor, even if they bring a portion of 
their required labor from home country to ensure quality. We account for 
availability of labor through the labor force participation rate, which includes the 
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proportion of population ages 15 to 64 that is either working or actively seeking 
work. 
h. Private Consumption 
 
Private consumption is the main driver of GDP growth in developing 
countries and offers a large market for foreign investors to market their products 
due to the persistent gap between supply and demand in these markets. We 
include household final consumption expenditure as a % of GDP and expect it to 
have a positive impact on FDI in developing countries.  
III.C Data Sources 
 
The data were obtained from various sources. The main indicators are 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) database. The 
macroeconomic data were sourced from the IMF World Economic Outlook 
(WEO) and the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database, corruption 
indexes were sourced from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
researchers’ database and from Transparency International (TI), whereas 
corporate tax rates were sourced from KPMG Corporate Tax Rate Database. 
III.D Methodology 
 
Having discussed the factors affecting FDI in developing markets and after 
defining our variables and the time horizon, we now estimate our model for FDI 
determinants. We follow the literature in modelling FDI determinants, where 
commonly a measure of FDI is regressed on a number of variables identified as 
determinants of FDI. In the baseline panel data model, FDI will be regressed on 
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two groups of variables, a set of government investment policies and a set of 
economic environment factors, as follows: 
Yit = α + λXit +Ɛit ,  
Ɛit = ŋi + γt + Uit 
where Yit is the dependent variable which is measured as FDI as a share 
of GDP in country i at year t. Xit are the explanatory variables divided between (1) 
government investment policy factors (tax rate, tariff rate, infrastructure, access 
to credit and corruption) and 2) economic environment factors (GDP growth, 
private consumption, openness to trade, services as a share of GDP, natural 
resource abundance, inflation and exchange rate stability). ŋi represents 
unobservable country-specific characteristics and γt represents time-specific 
effects. The model is estimated using E-views software, where the dataset is 
unbalanced due to some missing data points but all countries in the dataset are 
observed every period.  
III.E Specification Tests 
 
We started by inspecting the data for outliers for each variable within each 
country separately. The data had very few outliers within each country; however 
there are vast differences in the value of variable across countries, which will be 
taken into account by using the fixed effect model. The descriptive statistics of 
the variables are also reported in table 3 in appendix. 
A pooled OLS model was then estimated as a starting step, which does 
not account for unobservable country or period-specific effects, shown in table 3 
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below. In our case, the pooled OLS is less appropriate as we need to account for 
these effects in our model due to the vast difference in sizes and economic 
characteristic of some countries. 
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Table 3: Pooled OLS Model Output 
Variable Coefficient 
    
C -14.812*** 
  (0.000) 
FDI/GDP*100 (-1) 0.512*** 
  (0.000) 
Corporate Tax Rate -0.025 
  (0.468) 
Tariff Rate  0.035 
  (0.319) 
Mobile Cellular Sub 0.003 
  (0.360) 
Credit to Private Sector/GDP*100 0.002 
  (0.660) 
ICRG Corruption 0.267 
  (0.233) 
GDP Growth 0.206*** 
  (0.000) 
HH Cons Expenditure/GDP*100 0.078*** 
  (0.000) 
Exports of Goods and Services/GDP*100 0.041*** 
  (0.000) 
Services/GDP*100 0.135*** 
  (0.000) 
Natural Resources Rents 0.089*** 
  (0.000) 
Labor Force Participation 0.017 
  (0.412) 
Inflation (-1) -0.003 
  (0.829) 
Log Exchange Rate  0.021 
  (0.754) 
    
Adjusted R-squared 0.839 
F-statistic 141.892 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000 
Periods included 27 
Cross-sections included 20 
Total panel observations 379 
Akaike info criterion 4.932 
P-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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To choose between the fixed and random effects specifications, the 
Hausman test was utilized to choose between the fixed effect model and random 
effect model. The null hypothesis of the Hausman test is that the preferred model 
is random effects whereas the alternate hypothesis is that the model is a fixed 
effects model. The test results shown in table 4 below show that the p-value is 
less than 0.01, thus we reject the null hypothesis and thus the fixed effect model 
should be used in this case. Hence, the pooled OLS is rejected in favour of a 
fixed-effects model incorporating country-specific effects. 
Table 4: Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test   
Ho: The preferred model is random effects 
Ha: The model is a fixed effects model 
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section random 36.394 14 0.0009 
 
To correct for autocorrelation, the first lag of the dependent variable was 
added to the model and the results of the Durbin-Watson test now indicate no 
autocorrelation between the residuals, as shown in model output below.  
The last step was to check for multicollinearity between the independent 
variables through the correlation matrix, which is reported in table 4 in appendix. 
The results do not show any significant correlation between variables above 0.6, 
with the exception of a slightly high correlation between exports of goods and 
services as a % of GDP and FDI as a % of GDP, which stood at 0.78 and is not 
alarming and can be ignored in our opinion.  
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IV. Empirical Results and Discussion 
 
IV.A. Baseline Panel Data Results 
Our baseline model estimation results show that mobile cellular 
subscriptions, real GDP growth, household consumption as a % of GDP, exports 
of goods and services as a % of GDP, natural resources rent as a % of GDP, 
services as a % of GDP and as well as the first lag of FDI as a share of GDP 
have a significant effect on FDI. As a group, these factors account for around 
85% of the variation in FDI as a share of GDP, as shown in the following output 
table 5 below.  
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Table 5: Baseline Panel Data Model Output with Fixed Effects 
Variable Coefficient 
C -18.170*** 
  (0.032) 
FDI/GDP*100 (-1) 0.357*** 
  (0.000) 
Corporate Tax Rate -0.021 
  (0.668) 
Tariff Rate  0.058 
  (0.238) 
Mobile Cellular Sub 0.018* 
  (0.069) 
Credit to Private Sector/GDP*100 0.017 
  (0.160) 
ICRG Corruption -0.223 
  (0.532) 
GDP Growth 0.171*** 
  (0.004) 
HH Cons Expenditure/GDP*100 0.125* 
  (0.055) 
Exports of Goods and Services/GDP*100 0.057*** 
  (0.001) 
Services/GDP*100 0.142* 
  (0.074) 
Natural Resources Rents 0.186** 
  (0.015) 
Labor Force Participation 0.010 
  (0.891) 
Inflation (-1) -0.017 
  (0.379) 
Log Exchange Rate  -0.205 
  (0.704) 
  
 Adjusted R-squared 0.848 
F-statistic 36.727 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000 
Periods included 27 
Cross-sections included 20 
Total panel  observations 379 
Akaike info criterion 4.981 
P-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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In line with the main conclusion in the literature, we found a very strong 
significant positive effect of GDP growth on FDI inflows, implying that FDI is 
attracted to countries that are growing at a faster pace. The coefficient of GDP 
growth is 0.17, showing that an increase of 1% in GDP increases FDI inflows as 
a share of GDP by 17%. This confirms that FDI in developing markets is indeed 
market-seeking and flows to high growth host markets. It is worth mentioning that 
when we used per capita GDP as a proxy for market size, it did not have a 
significant effect on FDI. The same result occurs when absolute GDP in USD is 
used as a proxy for market size. 
Household final consumption also has a positive role in attracting FDI, 
augmenting the finding that investors seek high purchasing power in their 
decision to invest and open new markets for their products, especially in 
developing countries where population growth is high and there is always a gap 
between supply and demand for consumer products.   
Another important explanatory variable among the economic environment 
factors is natural resources rent as a % of GDP. Natural resources has a positive 
significant effect on attracting FDI in our model with a coefficient of 0.186, 
suggesting a substantial increase in FDI for an increase in natural resources 
rents. This suggests that resource-seeking FDI to take advantage of unutilized 
resources is very evident in countries in our model, which we found common in 
the review of the literature on developing countries as well. This type of FDI’s 
main focus would be either exploiting the natural resources in host country or 
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exporting it as raw material to home country for consumption or production input 
of an otherwise scarce resource. 
Closely related to natural resources and market size, is trade openness, 
measured by exports of goods and services as a share of GDP, one of the most 
significant explanatory variables in our model, in line with the literature. FDI is 
attracted to countries that adopt more trade liberalization policies and encourage 
exports and imports, which would serve market-seeking FDI that operates in a 
low-cost host country and wants to export to nearby markets to take advantage 
of proximity and access to large markets. Furthermore, the degree of trade 
openness is likely to affect the international capital flows, as more liberalized 
countries signal to investors that they can easily repatriate their capital and 
profits easily without any restrictions, unlike countries with strong protection 
measures that restrict trade. It can also be argued that FDI and trade relation is 
bi-directional, where countries with higher FDI tend to have higher trade volumes, 
thus attracting more FDI that aims to benefit from exporting to nearby markets. 
Furthermore, services as a % of GDP has a strong positive effect on FDI, 
which is in line with the substantial increase in investment in services sectors 
over the past decade witnessed in developing countries. This is also consistent 
with other studies that show that the boost in the services sector came on the 
expense of the manufacturing sector in most countries and caused the structural 
shift of FDI from the manufacturing sector to the services sector.  
The insignificance of labor, inflation and exchange rate variables in our 
model are striking, though they have the expected signs. Surprisingly, the labor 
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force participation rate should be an important indicator on the supply of labor in 
the host markets. This may be due to the fact that participation does not account 
for quality of labor, which can be abundant but unskilled and require time and 
cost to train and educate. 
The lag of inflation and the change in exchange rate, accounting for 
macroeconomic stability, were also not significant. This can be explained by the 
fact that high economic growth is usually associated with higher inflation as well 
as currency fluctuations and is a common factor in most developing countries, 
and thus is not a main factor in the decision making of these investors. 
As for investment policy factors, mobile cellular subscriptions rate, a proxy 
for infrastructure development of the country, was the only significant explanatory 
variable among the group with a positive coefficient of 0.018. This confirms that 
infrastructure development plays an important role in FDI decisions by investors 
as it reduce the additional costs associated with poor infrastructure regions and 
enhances productivity, which would serve to attract sophisticated investments 
that need a solid infrastructure and technological base to invest. 
As expected, tax rates and tariff rates were insignificant in the model, 
showing that FDI is not attracted by tax or tariff incentives in developing countries 
if there are favorable factors like market size and openness to trade for example, 
which is consistent with previous conclusions from the literature. Tax rate had the 
expected negative sign, whereas tariff rate had a positive sign, suggesting that 
tariff-jumping may be more dominant in developing countries in our model. 
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Credit to the private sector does not also impact FDI in our model, which 
might be due to the fact that foreign investors have access to credit from home 
country and do not rely much on domestic credit from local banks, which comes 
at higher interest rates most of the time.  
The second surprise in our study is that corruption did not have a 
significant effect on FDI inflows. However, this is in line with several studies in 
the literature and shows that foreign investors might tolerate higher corruption in 
developing countries if the macroeconomic environment of the country is 
attractive enough. 
Finally, the first lag of the dependent variable, FDI as a share of GDP is 
very significant and has a strong effect on current FDI. This exhibits the nature of 
FDI which are consistent over time and tend to be long term investments, unlike 
portfolio flows for example, and countries with high FDI tend to attract more FDI 
and vice versa, as it signals to foreign investors that conditions are favorable. 
Furthermore, FDI has an agglomeration effect for investments in same industries 
are usually located closely to benefit from spillovers and externalities as well as 
benefit from know-how. 
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IV.B. Robustness Check 
We estimated a second alternative model, Model 2, with different variables 
for corruption, labor, inflation and exchange rate, to test the robustness of the 
results of our baseline model. For the corruption, we use the Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) published by Transparency International, instead of the 
ICRG Corruption index utilized in the baseline model. For the labor indicator, we 
use population growth rate to account for abundance of labor instead of labor 
force participation, which was not significant in the first model. We also switched 
the annual inflation rate with the GDP deflator and the change in exchange rate 
with the level of the official exchange rate of the local currency versus the USD. 
The comparison of the two models is shown in table 5 below. 
The results of Model 2 show that the alternate variables for corruption, 
labor, inflation and exchange rate are all still statistically insignificant. 
Furthermore, the same variables from Model 1 remain the most important 
determinants of FDI inflows, with the exception of services as a % of GDP which 
has become insignificant, which confirms the robustness of the results of our 
baseline model. 
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Table 6: Baseline Panel Data Model vs. Alternate Model 
Variable Model 1 Variable Model 2 
C -18.170*** C -66.532 
  (0.032)   (0.480) 
FDI/GDP*100 (-1) 0.357*** FDI/GDP*100 (-1) 0.340*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000) 
Corporate Tax Rate -0.021 Corporate Tax Rate -0.017 
  (0.668)   (0.725) 
Tariff Rate  0.058 Tariff Rate  0.043 
  (0.238)   (0.372) 
Mobile Cellular Sub 0.018* Mobile Cellular Sub 0.019* 
  (0.069)   (0.051) 
Credit to Private Sector/GDP*100 0.017 Credit to Private Sector/GDP*100 0.019 
  (0.160)   (0.145) 
ICRG Corruption -0.223 Corruption Perception Index -0.012 
  (0.532)   (0.248) 
GDP Growth 0.171*** GDP Growth 0.165*** 
  (0.004)   (0.005) 
HH Cons Expenditure/GDP*100 0.125* HH Cons Expenditure/GDP*100 0.135** 
  (0.055)   (0.032) 
Exports of Goods and 
Services/GDP*100 
0.057*** 
Exports of Goods and 
Services/GDP*100 
0.060*** 
  (0.001)   (0.000) 
Services/GDP*100 0.142* Services/GDP*100 0.109 
  (0.074)   (0.156) 
Natural Resources Rents 0.186** Natural Resources Rents 0.176** 
  (0.015)   (0.023) 
Labor Force Participation 0.010 Population Growth  2.801 
  (0.891)   (0.595) 
Inflation (-1) -0.017 GDP Deflator (-1) -0.020 
  (0.379)   (0.215) 
Log Exchange Rate  -0.205 Official Exchange Rate 0.000 
  (0.704)   (0.572) 
  
 
  
 Adjusted R-squared 0.848 Adjusted R-squared 0.849 
F-statistic 36.727 F-statistic 37.026 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000 Prob (F-statistic) 0.000 
Periods included 27 Periods included 27 
Cross-sections included 20 Cross-sections included 20 
Total panel  observations 379 Total panel  observations 379 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.013 Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.999 
Akaike info criterion 4.981 Akaike info criterion 4.974 
P-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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From the above results, we can conclude that FDI is mainly attracted to 
large host markets with high growth potential and good infrastructure. Also it is 
clear that FDI favors open economies through which it can easily import and 
export its products to nearby markets and that the services sector and natural 
resources are usually the main targets of FDI in developing countries. 
 It is also obvious from our model that investment incentives weigh the 
potential of their investment in a market with the costs, including taxes, tariffs and 
higher corruption prevalence, and when the risk-adjusted returns are high 
enough, they accept these risks.  
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V. Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper is to identify the principal determinants of 
foreign direct investment on a cross country basis through a panel data model 
with fixed effects. Using a large sample of the top 20-FDI attracting developing 
countries, we find that macroeconomic variables in the host country, including 
GDP growth, trade openness, availability of natural resources, private 
consumption and the size of services sector are most significant in explaining 
foreign direct investment flows, while variables such as tax rates, tariff rates and 
corruption prevalence are not at all significant. These findings confirm that 
foreign investors in developing markets primarily seek large markets with high 
growth and open trade as well as good infrastructure, and are not attracted by 
investment incentives alone.  
As a policy recommendation to other developing countries, following the 
steps of their successful peers, governments should focus on economic 
environment and adopt the right macroeconomic policies that boost economic 
growth and liberalize its trade policies to increase trade. Furthermore, developing 
countries must invest in their infrastructure to create a conducive environment for 
foreign investment. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Name 
FDI/GDP*100 FDI (% of GDP) 
FDI/GDP*100 (-1) Lag of FDI (% of GDP) 
Corporate Tax Rate Corporate Tax Rate (%) 
Tariff Rate  Tariff rate, applied, all products (%) 
Mobile Cellular Sub Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) 
Credit to Private Sector/GDP*100 Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 
ICRG Corruption Index ICRG Corruption Index 
GDP Growth Real GDP growth (annual %) 
HH Cons Expenditure/GDP*100 
Households and NPISHs final consumption expenditure (% of 
GDP) 
Exports of Goods and 
Services/GDP*100 
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 
Natural Resources Rents Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) 
Services/GDP*100 Services, value added (% of GDP) 
Labor Force Participation 
Labor force participation rate, total (% of total population ages 15-
64) 
Inflation (-1) First lag of Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 
Log Exchange Rate Change in average annual official exchange rate (%) 
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Table 2: Countries and Average FDI Rankings 
 
Country Ranking Average FDI Inflows 1990-2017 (USD) 
China 112,422,526,099  
Hong Kong SAR, China 67,754,026,404  
Brazil 36,918,603,834  
Singapore 28,806,506,116  
Russian Federation 22,282,812,049  
Mexico 20,649,140,059  
India 16,023,647,326  
Chile 9,664,973,905  
Saudi Arabia 8,074,671,509  
Turkey 7,366,321,429  
Korea, Rep. 7,339,467,857  
Indonesia 7,182,586,927  
Argentina 7,092,097,188  
Colombia 6,520,282,103  
Vietnam 6,427,166,667  
Malaysia 6,231,160,403  
Kazakhstan* 6,012,543,700  
Thailand 5,924,230,634  
Israel 5,607,239,286  
United Arab Emirates* 4,810,449,190  
Peru 3,979,255,694  
Egypt, Arab Rep. 3,374,098,214  
Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank 
* Kazakhstan and United Arab Emirates were excluded from the model due to a large 
number of missing values 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of the Data 
 
 
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Observations 
FDI/GDP*100 (-1) 4.951 2.900 56.351 -2.757 6.967 379 
FDI/GDP*100  4.886 2.917 56.351 -2.757 6.829 379 
Corporate Tax Rate 27.685 29.000 49.220 15.000 6.631 379 
Tariff Rate  8.657 8.090 42.610 0.000 6.149 379 
Mobile Cellular Sub 76.830 80.152 249.763 0.088 55.953 379 
Credit to Private 
Sector/GDP*100 
65.744 50.058 233.211 9.683 46.322 379 
ICRG Corruption 2.693 2.500 4.500 1.000 0.872 379 
GDP Growth 4.242 4.572 15.240 -13.127 3.656 379 
HH Cons 
Expenditure/GDP*100 
58.344 61.412 88.124 26.026 11.224 379 
Exports of Goods and 
Services/GDP*100 
50.275 30.250 231.195 6.598 52.474 379 
Services/GDP*100 54.156 53.359 91.922 30.926 11.239 379 
Natural Resources Rents 6.474 3.867 55.312 0.000 9.067 379 
Labor Force Participation 63.048 62.297 83.278 29.600 8.910 379 
Inflation (-1) 7.635 4.296 105.215 -15.808 13.548 379 
Log Exchange Rate  3.269 2.049 10.031 -4.511 3.030 379 
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix 
 
 
  
FDI/GD
P*100 (-
1) 
FDI/GD
P*100 
Corpora
te Tax 
Rate 
Tariff 
Rate  
Mobile 
Cellular 
Sub 
Credit to 
Private 
Sector/
GDP*10
0 
ICRG 
Corrupti
on 
GDP 
Growth 
HH 
Cons 
Expendi
ture/GD
P*100 
Exports 
of 
Goods 
and 
Services
/GDP*1
00 
Services
/GDP*1
00 
Natural 
Resourc
es 
Rents 
Labor 
Force 
Particip
ation 
Inflation 
(-1) 
Log 
Exchan
ge Rate  
FDI/GDP*100 (-1) 1.000 
              
FDI/GDP*100 0.889 1.000 
             
Corporate Tax Rate -0.505 -0.508 1.000 
            
Tariff Rate  -0.435 -0.430 0.595 1.000 
           
Mobile Cellular Sub 0.463 0.478 -0.556 -0.560 1.000 
          
Credit to Private Sector/GDP*100 0.573 0.576 -0.525 -0.347 0.481 1.000 
         
ICRG Corruption 0.565 0.572 -0.409 -0.403 0.296 0.436 1.000 
        
GDP Growth 0.060 -0.015 0.001 -0.039 -0.079 0.062 0.025 1.000 
       
HH Cons Expenditure/GDP*100 -0.135 -0.130 0.322 0.321 -0.258 -0.408 -0.181 -0.164 1.000 
      
Exports of Goods and 
Services/GDP*100 
0.790 0.777 -0.522 -0.497 0.409 0.676 0.537 0.067 -0.424 1.000 
     
Services/GDP*100 0.662 0.657 -0.291 -0.362 0.392 0.410 0.511 -0.209 0.085 0.507 1.000 
    
Natural Resources Rents -0.156 -0.162 -0.182 -0.054 0.078 -0.192 -0.196 0.033 -0.392 -0.108 -0.478 1.000 
   
Labor Force Participation 0.067 0.077 -0.025 -0.023 0.097 0.280 -0.051 0.112 -0.188 0.158 -0.102 -0.155 1.000 
  
Inflation (-1) -0.193 -0.185 0.312 0.048 -0.255 -0.324 -0.110 0.005 0.284 -0.217 -0.109 -0.111 -0.229 1.000 
 
Log Exchange Rate  -0.139 -0.136 -0.092 0.061 -0.027 0.069 -0.075 0.022 0.182 -0.144 -0.350 0.034 0.394 -0.175 1.000 
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